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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE ACTION - STATE'S STATUTORY DELEGATION
OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO CREDITOR AND EXPANSION OF HIS
COMMON LAW REMEDIES HELD SUFFICIENT STATE ACTION TO SUBJECT
CREDITOR'S ACTION TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Brooks v. Flagg Brothers (2d Cir. 1977)
Plaintiff Shirley Herriott Brooks' brought a class action 2 seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief as well as monetary damages 3 under
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 4 The plaintiff alleged that
1. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that pursuant to an order of eviction of
the city court, the city marshall had removed plaintiff and her possessions from her
apartment. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.
Ct. 54 (1977). In spite of her request to make other arrangements, the marshall
informed her that the defendant would store her furniture. Id. at 766-67. The
defendant, who had accompanied the marshall, quoted a storage charge of $65 per
month. Id. at 767. Believing that she had no choice, plaintiff Brooks authorized the
defendant to proceed. Id. However, after the furniture was loaded on one of the
defendant's trucks, the price was increased to $178. Id. Although the plaintiff
protested, she eventually paid the bill. Id. Two days later, the plaintiff inquired as to
the duration of storage she would receive for her payment and was told she already
owed an additional $156. Id. Four days later, the plaintiff was given a "Combined
Uniform Household Goods Bill of Lading and Freight Bill" which reflected a balance
due of $156. Id. The plaintiff protested that the charges were unreasonable and that
she could not pay them. Id. Dispute over the storage charges continued for more than
two months. Id. Then, the defendant notified the plaintiff that, unless she paid her
outstanding balance, Flagg Bros. would advertise her goods for public auction. Id.
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this suit. Id. In resolving the issue before it, the
Second Circuit accepted the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id. at 766.
2. Id. The class acton was brought pursuant to FED.. Civ. P. 23 and on behalf of
those
Persons whose property is stored in a warehouse located in the State of New
York and whose property has been encumbered by a lien pursuant to New York
Uniform Commercial Code § 7-209 and subject to sale pursuant to New York
Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210 because of warehouse fees allegedly due,
without opportunity for a prior hearing.
553 F.2d at 767. The suit named as defendants Henry Flagg, and Flagg Bros.,
individually and as representatives of a proposed defendant class, consisting of
"warehousemen doing business in the state of New York and who impose liens and
subject goods to sale pursuant to New York Uniform Commercial Code §§209-210
[sic] without affording the owner of the goods a prior opportunity to be heard." Id. at
768. The marshall who evicted the plaintiff was also named as a defendant but this
claim was later dismissed. Id. at 8 n.6. The district court permitted a similarly situated
plaintiff, Gloria Jones, to intervene pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 24. Brooks v. Flagg
Bros., 63 F.R.D. 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In addition, the Attorney General of the
State of New York, the American Warehousemen's Association, the International
Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, Inc., the Warehousemen's Association of the
Port of New York, Inc., and the Cold Storage Warehousemen's Association of the Port
of New York were allowed to intervene as parties defendant. Id. at 415.
3. 533 F.2d at 767.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance ... of any State or
Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
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sections 7-209 and 7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code5 were
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 Essential-
ly, these provisions provide warehousemen with a lien against stored goods
for charges allegedly owed by the customer and permit private enforcement
of the lien by sale of the goods without a prior hearing as to the validity of
the debt.7 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York 8 dismissed the claim,9 concluding that the plaintiff failed to show
sufficient state involvement in the enforcement of the warehouseman's lien
to constitute state action.10 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit" reversed and remanded, holding that "the combination of
New York's statutory delegation of a distinct governmental power to the
warehouseman and its corresponding expansion of his common law
remedies, sufficed to thrust the state's involvement in the challenged
activity over the threshold of state action."' 2 Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 19770, cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977).
5. N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 7-209, 7-210 (McKinney 1964). On appeal, the plaintiff
challenged only § 7-210 while preserving her challange of § 7-209 for possible review
by the Supreme Court. 553 F.2d at 769.
6. 553 F.2d at 768. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 7-209, 7-210 (McKinney 1964). Under § 7-209, "[a] warehouse-
man has a lien against the bailor on the goods covered by a warehouse receipt or on
the proceeds thereof in his possession for charges for storage and transportation." Id.
§ 7-209. Section 7-210 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a warehouseman's lien may be
enforced by public or private sale of the goods in bloc or in parcels, at any time or
place and on any terms which are commercially reasonable, after notifying all
persons known to claim an interest in the goods.
Id. § 7-210(1). Under § 7-210(2), a warehouseman's lien "on goods other than goods
stored by a merchant in the course of his business" may only be enforced by
complying with the detailed notification provisions of that subsection. Id. § 7-210(2).
8.'Brooks v. Flagg, 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Jurisdiction was based on
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).404. F. Supp. 1060 n.3.
9. 404 F. Supp. at 1067. The district court did not rule on plaintiffs due process
claim or on her motion for class certification. Id.
10. Id. at 1066-67. The plaintiff must allege state action in order to state a claim
for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and to confer jurisdiction upon a federal district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
172 (1972).
11. Judge van Pelt Bryan, Senior District Judge of the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation, wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Circuit
Judge Timbers. Chief Judge Holden of the District of Vermont, sitting by designation,
filed a dissenting opinion.
12. 553 F.2d at 771. However, the court remanded the case for consideration of the
constitutional challenge. Id. at 774. The Second Circuit directed the lower court to
resolve the class certification issue prior to examining the procedural due process
question. Id. The court stated that the class determination "may have an important
bearing on the resolution of the due process claim" since it appeared that the named
plaintiffs, as consumers, could only challenge § 7-210(2) which applies to cases where
goods "other than goods stored by a merchant in the course of business" were
involved. Id. The Second Circuit noted that § 7-210(1) refers to those transactions in
which goods are stored by a merchant in "the typical commercial warehousing
situation" and therefore would "not be before the court ... unless commercial
warehouses are determined to be within a defendant class against which suit is
brought by an appropriate class of plaintiffs." Id. at 775.
[VOL. 23
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The principle that private conduct, as opposed to action by the state, is
generally immune from the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment 3 has
long been recognized.' 4 The rationale underlying this dichotomy is that, in a
democratic society, private structuring of relationships must .be encour-
aged1 5 while harsh and arbitrary governmental action prevented. 16 Most
courts have had little difficulty finding state action when an agent of the
government engages in the challenged activity, 17 although cases involving
indirect government action have resulted in contradictory decisions.' 8
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently mandated a case-by-case
analysis, concluding that "only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
its true significance."' 9
The nature of the "state action" analysis makes attempts at categoriza-
tion difficult.20 Nevertheless, an examination of Supreme Court precedent
13. The "under color of state law" provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is
equivalent to the fourteenth amendment state action requirement. See Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 n.7 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7
(1966).
14. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Court recognized that the fourteenth
amendment applies to state, not private, activities).
15. See Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1011, 1016 (1973).
16. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 656 (1974).
17. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (ex parte writ of replevin issued by
clerk of court pursuant to Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (ex parte summons issued by clerk of court
pursuant to Wisconsin wage garnishment statute). See also Burke & Reber, supra note
15, at 1042-45; Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 228 (1977); Note,
State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 849 (1974).
18. Compare Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), rev'd, 321 U.S. 649, 652(1944) (resolution of Texas Democratic Party denying blacks right to vote in primaries
and county clerk's adherence to resolution unanimously held not to be state action)
with Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruled Grovey and held that
discrimination of political party constituted state action because party was
empowered by state law to determine qualifications for primary election participants).
19. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). The Court
recently affirmed this basic principle in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974).
Traditionally, the state action inquiry has focused on whether or not
"sufficient state contact[s] factually do or do not exist." Glennon & Nowak, supra note
17, at 224. However, one commentator recently suggested that where official
government acts are not involved, the Court actually balances the values which are
advanced by each of the conflicting parties. See id. at 221. Another commentator has
maintained that the Court weighs the individual rights and the governmental
obligations deemed to have been violated. See Note, supra note 17, at 863. For early
suggestions that a balancing process, primarily in the context of racial discrimina-
tion, was central to the state action determinations, see Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading
Search For "State Action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208(1957). Although the "balancing" proposition presents an interesting viewpoint, this
approach has not received Supreme Court recognition. For an examination of the
considerations used by the Court in finding state action, see notes 21-27 and
accompanying text infra.
20. The Supreme Court recognized this difficulty when it noted: "While the
principle is easily stated, the question of whether particular ... conduct is private
1977-1978]
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indicates general areas in which state action may be gleaned from indirect
government involvement. The Court has held that state action existed when
a private party acted pursuant to a state statute or administrative
regulation.2' The Court has also found state action when the state and the
private party became so interdependent that the state was considered a joint
participant in the challenged activity. 22 Similarly, the Court has ruled that
the enforcement of a private agreement in a state court may give rise to a
finding of state action.23 Finally, it has been considered crucial in some
cases that the private entity carried out a public function while engaged in
the challenged action.24 While the cases indicate that the factual posture of
each case is the ultimate determining factor in the state action analysis, 25
... or amounts to 'state action' . . . frequently admits of no easy answer." Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). See also Burke & Reber, supra note 15,
at 1041 (cases resist any such attempt to be "structured and pigeonholed" because
they turn on particular facts); Glennon & Nowak, supra note 17, at 221 (no sufficient
formula for determining when sufficient government involvement is present).
21. See Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964) (state regulation which
required restaurants serving both races to have separate toilet facilities indirectly
compelled segregation). But see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1970) (racial
restrictions in testator's will did not constitute state action when he acted on his own
free will and there was no indication that state trust statutes which permitted such
restrictions were an inducement).
22. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961). In
Burton, the state had created an agency which had as its purpose "to provide
adequate parking facilities for the convenience of the public and thereby relieve the
'parking crisis.'" Id. at 717. The agency had built a parking garage which was to be
operated as a self-sustaining unit. Id. at 723. To this end, the defendant had received a
lease to operate a restaurant in the building. Id. When the discriminatory practices of
the defendant were challenged, the Court found the necessary state action through the
interdependence of the state and the defendant. Id. at 725.
23. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1948) (state court's enforcement of
racially restrictive covenant constituted state action).
24. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (state action existed
despite appointment of "private" trustees to operate municipal park); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1946) (because company-owned town was performing
public function, its curtailment of the right of a Jehovah's Witness to distribute
literature was state action subject to first amendment). But see Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (public function doctrine
possibly limited to functions traditionally performed by government - furnishing of
utility service not traditional state function).
25. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (dispositive
question is whether the aggregate of all factors, not any single factor or relationship,
provides requisite degree of state investment). The wide range of cases in which the
"state action" issue has been resolved has caused varying interpretations among
commentators. See note 19 supra. In addition, some courts have developed their own
"checklists" for resolving the issue. In Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975), the Second Circuit listed the following five
factors as "particularly important:"
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is dependent upon
governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental
regulatory scheme; (3) whether that scheme connotes government approval of the
activity or whether the assistance is merely provided to all without such
connotation; (4) the extent to which the organization serves a public function or
acts as a surrogate for the State; (5) whether the organization has legitimate
claims to recognition as a "private" organization in associational or other
constitutional terms.
496 F.2d at 629. In the same circuit, Judge Friendly has stated that the determination
"hinges on the weighing of a number of variables, principally the degree of
[VOL. 23
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the Court has also observed that a prerequisite to a finding of state action is
that the state's involvement with the private entity be related to the
challenged activity. 26
Although the doctrinal development in this area originated primarily in
those cases where racial discrimination, 27 first amendment,28 or political
rights2 9 were involved, the lower federal and state courts have increasingly
been called upon to resolve the "state action" issue in the context of various
creditor remedies 0 The results have been inconsistent, and have produced
government involvement, the offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of
preserving a private sector free from ... constitutional requirements." Wahba v. New
York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). For a thorough
review of the complexity of the issues involved in "state action" and the various
treatments accorded previous Supreme Court pronouncements, see generally Black,
The Supreme Court 1966 Term - Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Burke & Reber, supra note 15;
Glennon & Nowak, supra note 17; The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV.
47, 139-51 (1975); Note, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance:
An Expanding Protection of Personal Liberty And A Specialized Type of Property in
Our Economic System, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 502 (1971); Note, supra note 16; Note, supra
note 17.
26. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). In Jackson,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the utility company's monopoly
status sufficed to satisfy the "state action" requirement. Id. at 351-52. The Jackson
Court reviewed other cases involving monopolists and concluded that "[i]n each of
those cases, there was insufficient relationship between the challenged actions of the
entities involved and their monopoly status." Id. (emphasis added). See also Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964);
Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350(1962); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
28. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
29. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
399 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932).
30. Lien statutes have been the most frequently challenged creditor remedy in
this area. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975) (innkeeper's
lien); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (innkeeper's lien); Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34
(D.C. Conn. 1976) (garageman's lien); Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F.
Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (warehouseman's lien). In addition, a secured party's right
to self-help in repossessing and selling goods pursuant to U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504 has
resulted in extensive litigation of the "state action" issue. See, e.g., Turner v. Impala
Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496
F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
Challenges to New York lien statutes have been particularly numerous and
have resulted in considerable success for plaintiffs. In 1973, the highest state court
held that § 181 of the Lien Law, N.Y. LIEN LAw § 181 (McKinney 1966), was
unconstitutional because it permitted summary seizure of a guest's property by an
innkeeper without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Blye v. Globe-Wernicke
1977-1978]
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opinions which are difficult to reconcile. 3 ' While relying on Supreme Court
precedent,3 2 the lower courts have delineated additional factors to be
examined. These include: 1) whether the creditor had the right to engage in
the challenged activity at common law;3 3 2) whether a contract existed
which permitted the challenged activity;34 3) whether the action taken is
traditionally a state function; 35 4) whether a state official is involved in the
Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 19, 300 N.E.2d 710, 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 173 (1973). On the
state action issue, the court stated that "the actions of private persons, when
performing traditional public functions, may be attributed to the State for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at
175. The court further reasoned that since the execution of the lien "traditionally has
been the function of the sheriff . . . [b]y that token, their [innkeepers'] actions are
clothed with the authority of State law and their actions may be said to be those of the
State for purposes of the due process clauses." Id. at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 713-14, 347
N.Y.S.2d at 175 (citations omitted). Recently, a lower New York state court relied on
Blye to invalidate N.Y. LIEN LAw §§ 200-202, 204 (McKinney Supp. 1976). Sharrock v.
Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 56 App. Div. 2d 446, 393 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168-69 (1977). The
Sharrock court held that permitting a garageman to enforce his lien for repair and
service charges by public auction of the car without giving the owner an opportunity
to be heard violated due process. Id. at 455, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 172. Accord, Hernandez v.
European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973) (without discussing the state
action issue, court remanded to district court with directions to consider plaintiffs
constitutional challenge to N.Y. LIEN LAw § 204 on the merits).
Some commentators have suggested that the principles developed in previous
Supreme Court state action cases, particularly in the racial discrimination context,
cannot be applied to the question of creditor remedies. See Burke & Reber, supra note
15, at 1034-41. Additionally, some lower courts have held that a more sensitive
standard for state action exists in cases involving racial discrimination. See, e.g.,
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1976) (court expressly
recognizes existence of "double standard" of review for state action); Grafton v.
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1973) (limited state involvement
may be impermissible when it fosters discrimination but same limited involvement
may not rise to level of state action when other constitutional rights have been
deprived); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (racial discrimination so offensive and so much a prime target of
fourteenth amendment that a lesser degree of state involvement may constitute "state
action"). One commentator has suggested that this dichotomy of standards exists
primarily in cases in which state aid is the basis for a finding of state action. See
Note, supra 16, at 661.
31. Compare Boland Essex County Bank Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Mass.
1973) (state action found since state, by enacting U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504, significantly
encouraged self-help repossession) with Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (no state action found
since State of California was not significantly involved in self-help repossession
procedures). Compare Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 155-56
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (limited expansion of common law
remedy of innkeeper not significant state action) with Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430,
439 (5th Cir. 1970) (function traditionally reserved to state makes seizure by innkeeper
significant state action).
32. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
33. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 429-31 (9th Cir. 1975); Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1114 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Kipp v.
Cozens, 40 Cal. App. 3d 709, 715-16, 115 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426-27 (Ct. App. 1974). But see
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1974) (court discounted the importance of
this factor).
34. See, e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v.
Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1975). For an additional discussion of Melara, see
notes 46-52 and accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1974); Hall v. Garson,
430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss2/9
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
challenged activity;36 and 5) whether the creditor remedy is associated with
a specific debt.37 However, no one of these factors appears to be conclusive in
the state action determination.3"
Prior to Brooks, 39 only two courts outside the Second Circuit 4° had
resolved the specific issue of whether the sale of an individual's property by
a warehouseman pursuant to sections 7-209 and 7-210 of the Uniform
Commercial Code4l constitutes state action.42 Both the Ninth Circuit in
Melara v. Kennedy,43 and a Pennsylvania district court in Smith v. Bekins
Moving & Storage Co.,44 found an absence of state action.45
36. See, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (lien
enforcement through sale performed by state officials factor in finding of state
action); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 152-53, 520 P.2d 961,
965, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (1974) (supervision of lien enforcement by state agency
sufficient involvement for state action).
37. See, e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v.
Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1975); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir.
1974).
38. See Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1976).
39. Since Brooks was decided, the Eighth Circuit has examined the question as to
the constitutionality of the warehouseman's right to private enforcement of his lien.
Cox Bakeries of N.D. v. Timm Moving & Storage, 554 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1977). For an
additional discussion of Cox, see note 93 and accompanying text infra.
40. Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Bekins Moving &
Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The constitutionality of §§ 7-209, 7-210
was also examined by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York and a New York State court prior to Brooks. See Magro v. Lentinit Bros. Moving
& Storage, 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 961 (1972); Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 762, 358
N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974), modified and aff'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 928, 369 N.Y.S.2.d 804
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
In Magro, the court failed to resolve the state action issue since "the court
found that even assuming such action is a form of state action, plaintiffs' fourteenth
amendment rights are not violated by the operation of the statute." 338 F. Supp. at
466. The Magro court held that the procedure comported with due process, and
concluded that prejudgment hearings are only required when the goods are of such a
nature that deprivation of them will drive a debtor "to the wall." Id. at 468. This
distinction, however, which was derived from a narrow reading of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969), was
subsequently discredited. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1972).
In Jones, The Supreme Court of Kings County found both §§ 7-209, 7-210
violative of due process. Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d at 775,
358 N.Y.S.2d at 900. However, on appeal to the Appellate Division, Second
Department, the court set aside the constitutional ruling as premature since it might
be avoided by a determination favorable to the plaintiff on the cause of action to
recover possession of his property. Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 48 App.
Div. 2d 928, 929, 369 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (1975).
41. See note 7 supra.
42. It should be noted that a number of the courts have not decided the
constitutional issue involved in the private enforcement of a lien by sale. This has
resulted since, on the facts of the cases, property was detained but no sales were
threatened. See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (innkeeper's lien); Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d
990, 992 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975) (garageman's lien).
43. 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
44. 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
45. Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Bekins Moving
& Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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In Melara, the plaintiff contested the validity of storage charges which
accrued without his knowledge while his furniture was stored with the
defendant."6 Almost two years after the initial storage, the defendant
notified the plaintiff that, unless he paid his outstanding balance, the
furniture would be sold pursuant to section 7-210 of the California
Commercial Code.47 In response to plaintiffs contention that the extrajudi-
cial sale was violative of his due process rights, a unanimous court listed six
factors 8 upon which the resolution of the state action inquiry could be
based.49 After addressing each factor sequentially, the Ninth Circuit rejected
plaintiffs position.Y Specifically, the court stated that little importance
should be attributed to the inability of the warehouseman to enforce his lien
at common law.51 The court stated moreover that the "state function
rationale" had never been accepted in the Ninth Circuit.5 2
The district court in Smith,53 in a less detailed analysis, relied upon a
recent Third Circuit decision5 4 which held that the private lien enforcement
provisions of section 9-504 of the Pennsylvania Commercial Code5 and the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act5 6 did not involve state
46. 541 F.2d at 803. Plaintiff's house was sold by his conservator (guardian) in
December, 1972. Id. However, the plaintiff did not become aware that his furniture
was being stored by the defendant until he received a bill on March 15, 1973, for $227.
Id. The bill included amounts for packing, moving and storage. Id. After receiving the
bill, the plaintiff attempted to negotiate a settlement but was unsuccessful. Id.
47. Id. California Commercial Code § 7-210 provides the warehouseman with the
private lien enforcement remedy. CAL. COM. CODE § 7-210 (West 1964). See note 7
supra.
48. 541 F.2d at 805. The factors noted by the court were: 1) the source of the
creditor's authority; 2) the degree of state regulation; 3) the relationship between the
property and the underlying debt; 4) whether the state is a joint partner in the activity
or receives mutual benefits; 5) whether a contract providing for the challenged
activity exists; and 6) whether there has been a delegation of what traditionally had
been a state function through the enactment of the statute. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 808. The Ninth Circuit observed that the statute does not compel the
warehouseman to act. Id. at 806. In addition, the court noted that state regulation of
creditor practices was an insufficient basis for a finding of state action where there
was no direct action or review by state officials. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that
a contract existed which provided notice of the creditor's potential exercise of his
statutory right. Id. at 807. Moreover, the danger of abuse which might arise if the
creditor could attach any property of the debtor is eliminated since the statute
requires that there be a direct relationship between the property and the debt. Id.
Finally, the court concluded that the state was not a joint partner in the challenged
activity. Id. at 806-07.
51. Id. at 805.
52. Id. at 807-08. The "state function rationale" is based on the premise that a
state may not delegate functions normally exercised by the state to private
individuals and escape scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. See Hall v. Garson,
430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In
Smith, it appears that the plaintiffs voluntarily stored their furniture with the
defendant. Id. at 1262. Moreover, the plaintiff signed a contract which provided for a
general lien on all stored property with the right of the lienor to sell the property upon
default. Id. at 1262-63. The plaintiffs in Smith only challenged the constitutionality of
the sale provision contained in § 7-210. Id. at 1263 n.1.
54. Gibbs v. Titelman, 503 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974).
55. 502 F.2d at 1114. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §9-504 (Purdon 1970).
56. 502 F.2d at 1114. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§623-627 (Purdon 1965).
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action.5 7 By analogy, the Smith court concluded that no state action was
involved in the operation of section 7-210.58
The Second Circuit began its analysis in Brooks by acknowledging the
difficulty of the state action inquiry.5" Positing that the facts of each case
are determinative, the majority concluded that the ultimate question is
"whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged activity of the private entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."6
From this premise, the court first considered what state action standard
should be applied. Recognizing that standards for determining state action
have been developed in various contexts, 6' the majority discounted the
factors used by the district court below since they had been developed in a
case where the racial policies of a tax exempt private foundation were
challenged. 62 The majority concluded that a more appropriate analysis
would include reference to the class of cases dealing with the delegation of
governmental powers by the state.
63
With regard to this class of cases, the court noted that the Supreme
Court had not directly confronted the issue "whether a delegation of state
authority to creditors constitutes state action. ' ' 64 Moreover, the majority
57. 502 F.2d at 1114. In Gibbs, the plaintiffs purchased automobiles through an
installment sale contract which pro,ided the defendants with a security interest in
the car and the right to peacefully repossess the car upon default of the installment
payments. Id. at 1109. The plaintiffs challenged the defendants exercise of their right
to repossess without judicial intervention. Id. In rejecting a state action claim based
on the "state function" rationale, the court noted that the private remedy of self-help
repossession had existed very early at common law. Id. at 1114.
58. 384 F. Supp. at 1263. The Smith court also recognized that "the [Third Circuit]
specifically limited its holding to situations in which the contracts and agreements in
issue also authorized the self-help remedies utilized." Id. at 1263. In light of this, the
Smith court noted that the contract entered into between the parties provided for a
general lien upon stored property with the right to sell upon default. Id. Consequently,
the court stated: "To the extent, therefore, that the holding ... is restricted to
situations in which the self-help remedy is contractual as well as statutory, that
requirement is satisfied." Id. at 1264.
59. 553 F.2d at 769.
60. Id., quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
61. 553 F.2d at 770. The majority recognized that those standards which were
developed in racial discrimination cases were "easier to meet" than those which have
been formulated to deal with creditor remedies. Id. Also, the court noted that the
standards developed in cases involving state action through state regulation and
state aid were not helpful. Id.
62. Id. The district court applied the factors developed in Jackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). 404 F. Supp.
at 1062-63. For a compilation of factors considered in Jackson, see note 25 supra.
63. 553 F.2d at 770. Specifically, the court examined those cases involving due
process challenges to summary creditor remedies. Id. See, e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541
F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Anastasia
v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928
(1976); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975); Philips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); James v. Pinnix,
495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1970).
64. 553 F.2d at 770. The court remarked that the Supreme Court's only statement
on the subject was in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Id. In
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commented that the factors used by several other courts of appeals to resolve
the question had been applied "to varying degrees and with varying
results. '65 After listing these factors, the Second Circuit concluded that there
was sufficient state involvement in the challenged activity to support a
finding of state action.66
To justify this result, the court proceeded to examine the impact of the
statute on the challenged activity. Observing that the Supreme Court had
expressed its "concern over even temporary deprivations of property without
prior judicial determination of the amount owing, '67 the majority recognized
that this was inconsequential unless the state was implicated in the
deprivation. 6 However, the court determined that New York's delegation of
its sovereign power over binding conflict resolution and its traditional power
to execute a lien provided the requisite state presence. 69 Furthermore, the
court noted that at common law the warehouseman was compelled to seek
judicial enforcement of a lien similar to the one involved in the instant
Metropolitan Edison, the Supreme Court rejected the state action claim stating: "If we
were dealing with the exercise by [the power company] of some power delegated to it
by the State which is traditionally associated with the sovereignty ... our case would
be quite a different one." 419 U.S. at 352-53.
65. 553 F.2d at 770. The court noted the following factors:
whether the state has delegated one of its unique powers to a private person;
whether the common law rights of the creditor were expanded or merely codified;
whether the creditor's power amounts to a roving commission or exists only over
particular chattels that are closely connected with the debt; whether the
creditor's remedy was authorized by contract as well as statute; whether the
creditor's resort to the remedy was mandatory or optional; whether the state
extensively regulates the creditor's industry; and even whether title rests in the
debtor or creditor.
Id. (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 771. The court recognized that its holding was directly contrary to
Melara but concluded: "[W]e disagree with [Melara's] conclusions and are unper-
suaded by its analysis." Id. at 77"4. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
67. 553 F.2d at 774, citing North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601(1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The court interpreted these
cases as, at a minimum, standing for the proposition "that while judicial inquiry may
at times be postponed, an adequate judicial determination of liability must take place
before any deprivation of property if due process requirements are to be satisfied." 553
F.2d at 771. It is submitted that the court thought not only that state action existed in
the instant case, but also that § 7-210 violated due process. See id.
68. 553 F.2d at 771.
69. The court cited in a footnote a recent New York case, Blye v. Globe-Wernicke
Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973), which held that
enactment of N.Y. LIEN LAw § 181 (McKinney 1966) was state action. 553 F.2d at 771
n.l1. The Blye court ruled that "execution of a lien, be it a conventional security
interest ... writ of attachment ... or a judgment lien . . . traditionally has been the
function of the Sheriff." 33 N.Y.2d at 175, 300 N.E.2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175. See
alsd Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 56 App. Div. 2d 446, 393 N.Y.S.2d 166
(1977). The lower court in Brooks had distinguished Blye, concluding that the type of
lien involved in Blye only involved those with no particular relationship to the debt
and since the lien in Brooks was not of that variety, it did not follow that the
warehousemen's lien was a traditional state function. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 404 F.
Supp. 1059, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the
warehousemen's lien would be included in those liens described by the Blye court as
traditional functions of the sheriff. 553 F.2d at 771 n.11. Additionally, the Court was
[VOL. 23
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss2/9
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
case.70 In response to the warehouseman's contention that alteration of
common law rights is of minor significance, 71 the court conceded that
alteration alone would not be dispositive. 72 However, the majority noted that
enactment of section 7-210 drastically affected the nature of the debtor-
creditor relationship.73 The court reasoned that the effect of the statute was
to make the warehouseman the final judge over storage charges and provide
him with the power to enforce others' obligations to him.74 Therefore, the
majority determined that this conscious effort by the state to enhance the
warehouseman's common law position through a delegation of governmen-
tal power constituted state action?
5
Judge Holden, in a dissenting opinion, rejected the majority's conclusion
that the enforcement of the warehouseman's lien had traditionally been a
function of the sheriff.7 6 The dissent maintained, moreover, that New York's
reluctant to consider this issue at all since "this consideration bears only upon the
extent of the intrusion ... and not upon whether the state has in fact delegated some
of its sovereign power." Id.
70. 553 F.2d at 772. The court recognized that a form of the statute in question
had been in existence since 1879. Id. The majority further noted that this statute was
enacted subsequent to the passage of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 772 n.13.
71. Id. The defendants argued that the inquiry should deal not with the existence
of the common law right, but with the impact of the statute on private ordering. Id.,
quoting Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1973).
72. 553 F.2d at 772.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court recognized the general value of preserving a sphere of private
activity not subject to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The majority
noted that "this value is nonexistent, however, when a private party wields power
that belongs to the state and is subject to egregious abuse if not regulated." Id. at 772
n.15.
The court argued that this conclusion was consistent with applicable
precedent in the Second Circuit. Id. at 772. Specifically, the majority contended that
two previous cases, Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837
(1974) and Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1009 (1974), differed from Brooks because neither case involved an expansion of
common law remedies or a delegation of power traditionally exercised by the state.
553 F.2d at 773. Furthermore, the court maintained that the courts in Bond and
Shirley had relied, to some extent, on the fact that the parties had entered into
contracts permitting private repossession and sale. Id. at 773 n.16. In the instant case,
however, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the bill accepted by the
plaintiff six days after the initial storage was evidence that she had agreed to the
sale. Id. at 767 n.3.
The majority also examined a recent district court opinion which involved a
Connecticut statute that provided for a garageman's lien for towing and storage
charges. Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D. Conn. 1976). In addition, the
statute authorized the garageman to foreclose on the lien by sale. Id. at 36. The
Tedeschi court held that the enactment of the statute constituted state action since it
"authorized conduct which would otherwise be impermissible." Id. at 42. The Brooks
court noted that the statute in Tedeschi was analogous to § 7-210. 553 F.2d at 773.
Finally, the majority was influenced by the decision of Hernandez v.
European Auto Collision Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit held in
Hernandez, without explicitly deciding the state action issue, that a New York lien
statute was subject to constitutional attack. Id. at 382-83.
76. 553 F.2d at 776 (Holden, J., dissenting). Judge Holden pointed out that "the
state of New York has not been significantly involved in the enforcement of the
warehouseman's lien since 1879 unless, of course, either the bailor or bailee elected to
resort to judicial action." Id.
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involvement was insufficient to establish state action. 77 Specifically, Judge
Holden noted that no state agency or official was involved in any aspect of
the sale, 8 and that the statute did not command the warehouseman to
pursue the statutory remedies.
79
It is readily apparent that the resolution of the state action issue
generally is not subject to any precise formula.80 The sharply divided federal
and state court opinions reflect the elasticity of the applicable standard.8'
The fundamental policy issue appears to be "whether to assign responsibil-
ity for a particular decision to the state or the private party. '82 It is
submitted that, with this general policy in mind, the Brooks court rendered a
well-reasoned opinion.
With respect to the mode of analysis employed by the Brooks court, it is
suggested that the court appropriately examined the cumulative effect of
section 7-210.83 By analyzing the issue in this manner, the Second Circuit
focused on the significance of the state's involvement in the challenged
activity.84 Although not explicitly stated in Supreme Court precedent, it is
submitted that the appropriate inquiry includes an examination into
whether the state's involvement is related to the challenged activity 5 and
whether such relationship is significant.8
6
77. Id. The dissent viewed the issue more restrictively than the majority. Judge
Holden stated: "The question ... is whether the remedies provided by §§ 7-209 and
7-210 ... are 'commanded' by the State or 'so entwined with governmental policies or
so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the
constitutional limitations placed upon state action.'" Id. at 775-76 (Holden, J.,
dissenting), quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). Moreover, the dissent
contended that the reasoning in Melara was sound. 553 F.2d at 776 (Holden, J.,
dissenting).
78. 553 F.2d at 776 (Holden, J., dissenting).
79. Id. The factors used by Judge Holden to measure state action varied from
those used by the majority. For a discussion of the factors used by the majority, see
note 65 supra. Specifically, the dissent concluded that the question "hinges on the
weighing of a number of variables, principally the degree of government involvement,
the offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of preserving a private sector free from
the constitutional requirements applicable to the governmental institutions." 553 F.2d
at 776 (Holden, J., dissenting), quoting Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). Judge Holden also emphasized the "neutral"
position of the state. 553 F.2d at 776 (Holden, J., dissenting).
80. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the
Court noted: "Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the
conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record are by no means
declared as universal truths ...." Id. at 725.
81. See notes 30-58 and accompanying text supra. See also note 31 supra.
82. See The Supreme Court 1974 Term, supra note 25, at 150.
83. See 553 F.2d at 771-72.
84. Id.
85. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (insufficient
relationship between challenged actions and utility's monopoly status to constitute
state action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972) (detailed
regulation of liquor licenses cannot be said to in any way foster racial discrimination).
86. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (where impetus for
discrimination is private, the State must have significantly involved itself with the
invidious discrimination); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961) (private conduct abridging individual rights is not state action unless to some
significant extent the state in any of its manifestations has become involved).
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In determining whether the state's relationship to creditors was
constitutionally significant, it is submitted the Brooks court's opinion is not
inconsistent with Supreme Court 7 or Second Circuit 8 precedent. Further-
more, the Brooks court accurately noted that without section 7-210, the
87. Although direct authority does not exist, it is suggested that the Secjnd
Circuit's reliance on the "state function rationale" was arguably proper in light of the
cases decided by the Supreme Court based on the "public function" doctrine. See note
24 and accompanying text supra. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Court recognizes existence of the "public function" doctrine).
For a discussion of the "state function" rationale, see note 52 and accompanying text
supra.
In addition, it is submitted that the Brooks decision is not inconsistent with
the recent Supreme Court decisions in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). While the Court
found an absence of state action in both Jackson and Moose Lodge, it is suggested
that Brooks may be distinguished from these decisions. In Jackson, the issue was
whether the termination of services by a utility was state action. See Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 351. Among other things, the plaintiffs state
action arguments were based on the monopoly status of the utility, the state's
extensive regulation of the industry and a provision in a general tariff approved by
the State Public Utility Commission which permitted the termination. Id. at 351-58.
Although there was a definite relationship between the utility and the state in
Jackson, it appears that the Court was influenced by the fact that the Public Utility
Commission did not actively support the provision in the utility's general tariff which
permitted the utility to terminate services for non-payment of bills. See id. at 354-55.
The Jackson Court noted that when the hearing was held on the general tariff, the
Commission never even considered the challenged provision. Id. at 355. Furthermore,
the Court made reference to the fact that the utility had the right to terminate service
for nonpayment of bills prior to the state's regulatory involvement. Id. at 354 n.1l.
Therefore, on the basis of these facts, Jackson may be distinguished from the instant
case. Moreover, it is submitted that, in contrast to Jackson, the state took affirmative
action in Brooks by enacting § 7-210. The result of the enactment was to authorize
"private" action which would otherwise be impermissible. See Tedeschi v. Blackwood,
410 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D. Conn. 1976) (garageman's lien statute constitutes state action
since it authorized conduct which would otherwise be impermissible). It is suggested
that these distinctions raise the involvement of the state in the case sub judice to a
sufficient level of significance to satisfy the state action requirement.
In Moose Lodge, the plaintiff contended that the detailed regulation of liquor
licenses by Pennsylvania, along with a substantive regulation passed by the
Pennsylvania Liquor Authority, provided sufficient state action to allow the Court to
examine the Lodge's discriminatory practices under the fourteenth amendment. See
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 171, 177. The substantive regulation
required "every club licensee [to] adhere to all the provisions of its constitution and
by-laws." Id. at 177. In addition, petitioner Moose Lodge had admitted that its
constitution and by-laws contained a discriminatory rule. Id. at 179. Although the
Court recognized that the regulation of liquor licenses in Pennsylvania was extensive,
the Court concluded that there was no relationship between the regulatory practices of
the state and the discriminatory practices of the lodge. Id. at 177. Lacking such a
relationship between the challenged activity and the state, the Court determined that
a state action finding was improper. See id. The Brooks case does not suffer from this
infirmity since there existed a direct relationship between the state's action (the
enactment of § 7-210) and the challenged activity (the private enforcement of the
lien). Moreover, without the state's action, the creditor could not have engaged in the
challenged activity. See 553 F.2d at 772.
88. Although there is an absence of direct authority, the Brooks decision may be
distinguished from other Second Circuit decisions in the area of creditor remedies. See
Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974); Shirley v.
State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974). Brooks may
be distinguished from Shirley as the latter court relied, to some extent, on the
existence of a contract between the parties while rejecting a state action contention.
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creditor would be unable to engage in the challenged activity.89 While some
commentators suggest that relying on common law distinctions would lead
to anomalous results by subjecting the same private action to different
standards in different states,90 the Supreme Court has implied that common
law distinctions may be relevant in appropriate cases.9 1 Moreover, this
would not be the only area which is influenced by state law in determining
the applicability of the fourteenth amendment.9 2
The Brooks decision will undoubtedly increase the pressure on the
Supreme Court to resolve the state action issue vis a vis summary creditor
remedies. Indeed, the instant case joins an already significant list of
conflicting lower court decisions in this area.93 Since this conflict may be
attributable to the fact that lower courts are presently forced to apply
principles developed by the Supreme Court under different circumstances,9
this diversity will most likely continue until the Court directly resolves the
issue.9 5 However, since the factual posture of each case is extremely
See Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d at 741. Furthermore, the Shirley court noted
that the right of peaceful repossession without a hearing is a right the creditor would
have had even absent the statute. Id. at 742. Brooks may also be distinguished from
Bond since the Bond court expressly determined that wage assignments were not a
traditional state function. See 494 F.2d at 311.
89. 553 F.2d at 771-72.
90. See Burke & Reber, supra note 15, at 47.
91. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354 n.11 (1974).
Although Jackson was not controlled by the common law position of the public utility,
it is submitted that the Court's notation may indicate that had the utility relied solely
on the tariff approved by the state as the source of its power to terminate services, the
result might have been different. Id. at 354 n.11.
92. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In Bishop, the issue before the Court
was whether the plaintiff, a policeman for the City of Marion, North Carolina, had a
property interest in continued employment. Id. at 343. The Court held that state law
was dispositive on the issue as to whether an individual has a property interest
protected under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 344-45.
93. See note 31 and accompanying text supra. This list has already been
increased by one. See Cox Bakeries of N.D. v. Timm Moving & Storage, 554 F.2d 356
(8th Cir. 1977). In Cox, the owner of a bakery stored his bakery equipment with the
defendant when the lease for his bakery expired. Id. at 357. Subsequently, a dispute
arose over hauling and storage charges. Id. Unable to recover payment from the
plaintiff, the defendant sold the bakery equipment pursuant to North Dakota law. Id.
at 358. Relying partly on the Brooks decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the
statutory enactment was sufficient state involvement to constitute state action. Id. at
359. Crucial to the court's analysis was the expansion of the common law remedy
given by the state through the enactment of the statute and the absence of any
private agreement permitting the sale. Id. at 358. Specifically, the court stated: "In
short, the state has delegated the traditional roles of judge, jury and sheriff to [the
defendant] without providing for any judicial supervision or other safeguards." Id.
94. See generally Burke & Reber, supra note 15, at 1040-41.
95. Even after an affirmative finding of state action, significant additional issues
must be resolved. First, the plaintiff must prove that a substantive property right
exists which is protected under the fourteenth amendment. See Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 359 (1974). If a property right is established,
the plaintiff must then prove that he was deprived of the property without due process
of law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Whether a particular creditor practice violates due process is not easily
determined. The Supreme Court's initial pronouncements in the debtor-creditor due
process area appeared to indicate that only where "necessaries" are involved must the
debtor be given a hearing before any deprivation takes place. See Sniadach v. Family
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important in the state action determination,96 a subsequent Supreme Court
opinion may not completely resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, it is hoped
that the Supreme Court will soon undertake to provide a well-reasoned
opinion which will offer better guidance to the lower courts and thereby
benefit all parties in the commercial world.
9 7
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Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969). A few years later, this principle was expanded
to require a prior hearing before the deprivation of any property right protected under
the fourteenth amendment. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). However, two
years after Fuentes, the Court held that seizure of goods prior to a hearing was
permissible in certain cases. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Most of
the decisions since Mitchell have carefully weighed the interests of the creditor and
the debtor with the objective of ensuring that proper safeguards exist for both parties.
See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
96. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
97. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has granted the defendants'
petitions for certiorari. 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977).
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